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ESTABLISHING MORE EFFECTIVE MERGER
CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Thomas B. Mann II*
INTRODUCTION
The European Community has not adopted a standard set of guidelines to regulate merger activity. Instead, the European Community relies on an archaic set of laws that are ineffective in dealing with increasing merger activity. Attempts have been made to eliminate this
problem. In 1973, the Commission of the European Community
adopted a proposal intended to provide more effective merger control.1
The Proposal, however, has not passed the Council of the European
Communities, forcing the Commission to rely on the law established in
Continental Can v. Commission2 for regulation of mergers.
This Comment suggests two possible methods that the European
Community could adopt to achieve more systematic merger control.
Section I describes the Community's present merger control system, including the system's scope and its inadequacies. The Comment then
examines the merger Proposal and analyzes why the Commission continually fails to adopt the Proposal. The Comment also notes that the
level of merger activity in the European Community increased significantly in the past few years. Finally, this Comment recommends that
the Commission either (1) retract some of its executive authority concerning the regulation of mergers through an additional amendment to
the Proposal or (2) begin utilizing article 85 of the Treaty of Rome as
a supplement to article 86 in the control of mergers. 3 These two sugges* J.D., 1987, Washington College of Law, The American University.

1. The Proposal for a Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 16 O.J. EUR. COM. (No. C 92) 1, 2 (1973) [hereinafter Proposal]; 12 Common Mkt. L.R. D207 (1973).
2. Continental Can v. Commission, Case No. 6/72, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
215, reprinted in [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) f 8171
(1973). This is the only formal decision prohibiting a merger under article 86. Coi.tttsSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMUbIuNITY LAw 349
(1983) [hereinafter THIRTY YEARS]; Reynolds, Merger Control in the EEC, 17 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 407 (1983) [hereinafter Reynolds]. See infra notes 5-10 and accom-

panying text (discussing the substantive scope of the decision in Continental Can).
3. The Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome), March
25, 1957, Articles 85 and 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48 (hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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tions are designed to overcome the most fundamental problems that
exist with the regulation of merger activity in the Community. A failure to follow these recommendations, or something similar, will result
in the Community's continued failure to regulate mergers effectively.
I. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL UNDER
ARTICLE 86
A.

THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT MERGER CONTROL SYSTEM

1. Substance of Continental Can Decision
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome stipulate the antitrust laws
of the European Economic Community (EEC).4 In Continental Can,
4. Id. According to article 85:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings; decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market; and in particular, those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Id. Article 86 reads:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist of:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
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the European Court of Justice ruled that the Commission had the
power to prohibit mergers under article 86.1 The Court held that an
enterprise violates article 86 when through a merger it increases its
already dominant market position to a point that substantially weakens
the competitive structure of the relevant market.6 Although subsequent
non-merger cases7 delineate more precise guidelines to construe "market domination" 8 and "abusive behavior" in article 86, such standards
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id.
Unlike the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) has specific provisions within its establishing treaty that allow regulation
of merger activities. The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,
April 18, 1951, Article 66, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. Article 66 supplies the ECSC's High
Authority with enormous discretion to determine the legitimacy of transactions affected
by mergers or acquisition of shares. Id.
5. Continental Can v. Commission, Case No. 6/72, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
215, 243, reprinted in [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) D
8171 (1973).
6. See id. at 245 (establishing the standard for abuse when "an undertaking in a
dominant position strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition ... ").
The decision in Continental Can made it clear that the concept of abuse is not confined to certain unfair behavior toward suppliers or consumers but that it could entail a
company simply using its market position to prohibit potential competition and reinforce its dominant position. D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAw AT
THE E.E.C. 305 (1980) [hereinafter D. WYATT & A. DASWOOD]. Thus, Continental
Can seemed to break the causal link between a dominant position and the abuse of a
dominant position in that any strengthening of a position is prohibited under article 86,
regardless of the means by which such strengthening is achieved. Id.
7. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY, point 150 (1981) [hereinafter TENTH REPORT] (stating that the Commission has scrutinized the legality of prospective mergers by relying on the concepts of
abuse and dominant position developed in several non-merger cases such as United
Brands, infra note 8, and Hoffman-LaRoche, infra note 9.
8. See United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case No. 27/76, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 461, 520. In the decision in United Brands the court stated:
"The dominant position referred to in [article 86] relates to a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its
consumers."
United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case No. 27/76, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207,
277.
9. See United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case No. 27/76, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 207, 294 (proclaiming that simply refusing to supply a reliant enterprise had
enough effect on competition in the common market to constitute an abuse); HoffmanLaRoche v. Commission, Case No. 85/76, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 552 (ruling
that because Hoffman-LaRoche was already in a dominant position, its conduct of engaging in exclusive purchasing and loyal rebate agreements constituted an abuse in
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have not been applied in a merger context. 10
2.

Current Procedurefor Premerger Control

Article 87 of the Treaty of Rome directs the Council to adopt measures that give effect to the antitrust articles to define the Commission's
role.11 Pursuant to article 87, the Council adopted Regulation 17/6212
that sets forth the Commission's procedure for implementing articles
85 and 86.13
that it further weakened competition in that market). Although these cases do not specifically address mergers, they do add flesh to the meaning of abuse in the context of
article 86.
Subsequent non-merger cases have followed the Continental Can view that a further
weakening of the competitive structure in a relevant market by a dominant enterprise
would constitute an abuse. See Hoffman-LaRoche v. Commission, Case No. 85/76,
1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 461, 552 (stating that " . . . since the course of conduct
under consideration is that of an undertaking occupying a dominant position on a market where for this reason the structure of competition has already been weakened,
within the field of article 86, any further weakening of the structure of competition
may constitute an abuse of dominant position").
10. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 413 (stating that the terms of article 86 have
not been elucidated in a merger context since Continental Can).
11. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 87. Article 87 states:
1. Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty the Council shall,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the
principles set out in Articles 85 and 86.
If such provisions have not been adopted within the period mentioned, they
shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed in
particular:
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 85(1) and
in Article 86 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments;
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 85(3), taking into
account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and to simplify
administration to the greatest possible extent on the other;
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of
the provisions of Articles 85 and 86;
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of
Justice in applying the provisions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the provisions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this article.
Id.
12. Council Regulation 17/62, 5 J.0. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962) [hereinafter Regulation 17], translated in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPETITION
LAW IN THE

EEC

AND THE

ECSC 19 (1986).

13. Id. Where two or more firms intend to enter into an agreement that potentially
restricts competition, they may seek approval from the Commission in one of two ways.
They may notify the Commission at their own initiative to receive a negative clearance
in which the Commission states it will not apply article 85. Id. at art 2. Alternatively,
the firms may attempt to qualify for an exemption under article 85(3). Id. at art. 4.
Although firms planning to merge may not formally apply for exemptions under article
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Under the current competition laws of the European Community, the
Commission is restricted to reviewing mergers ex post facto."' There
are, nonetheless, certain procedures available to the Commission that
allow it to exercise some premerger control. The Commission can, for
example, take notice of potentially violative mergers through complaints, informal contacts at the initiative of the merging firms made
prior to the merger, and press reports."5 After a preliminary market
analysis, the Commission delivers an opinion deciding whether it will
challenge the proposed merger. The Commission often finds article 86
inapplicable.1 6 In cases where the Commission issues warnings, the participating firms usually retreat completely or somehow effectively
amend their merger agreement.17 Often, the Commission participates
in amendment negotiations to assist parties in interpreting the scope of
articles 85 and 86.18
4 of the Regulation, they may still seek "administrative letters" from the Commission
stating that it will not pursue investigation of the merger.
Other parties may also initiate proceedings against the prospective merger. An interested third party may file a complaint with the Commission alleging a violation of
article 86. Id. at art. 3. The Commission itself may also institute an investigation into
the possible antitrust implications of the planned merger. Id.
14. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 413 (explaining the Commission's limitation in reviewing mergers only after they have been consummated); see also Kamp, Antitrust in
the Common Market: The American Way, 12 AM. Bus. 145, 156 (1979) [hereinafter
Kamp] (citing ex post facto review of mergers as a major weakness in the use of article
86 to control mergers). Institutions within the European Communities have long recognized the Commission's inability to evaluate mergers before consolidation. As early as
1971, the European Parliament expressed the view that a form of premerger verification system should be employed. 16 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 66) 12 (1971).
15.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COM-

PETITION POLICY, point 165 (1984) [hereinafter THIRTEENTH REPORT].
16. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 7, at point 157 (reviewing the proposed sale of
Smithkline RIT to Baxter Travenol Laboratories). The Commission determined that
the geographic market and shares both firms held could hardly allow Baxter to "dominate the market or to strengthen [its] dominance" if it merged with RIT. COMI ssION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POuCY, point 133
(1980) [hereinafter NINTH REPORT] (reviewing the proposed Fichtel and Sachs/Huret
merger and concluding that there was no dominant position because there were other
major competitors in the market for cycle drive systems).
17. See COMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY, point 112 (1982) (reviewing the proposed purchase by Fortia

AB of Wright Scientific Ltd.). After Fortia's American competitor filed a complaint
with the Commission and thereafter warned the parties of this action, Fortia elected to
break off negotiations. TENTH REPORT, supra note 7, at point 152 (1981) (reviewing
the Pilkington/BSN-Gervais-Danone plan where a warning was issued on the finding
that the dominant position would extend to a broader Community level if the merger
were to occur).
18. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY, point 99 (1985) [hereinafter FOURTEENTH REPORT] (stating
that in the Philip Morris/Rothmans International case, 29 O.J. EUR. CormM,. (No. C
178) 3 (1984), the Commission acted as an accessible consultant to the parties who
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Another mechanism has evolved, apart from the informal opinion
process, that permits premerger scrutiny. The Commission may independently order, or third parties may demand, the taking of interim
measures. In Camara Care, Ltd. v. Commission,19 the Court of Justice
confirmed that the Commission had the power to order interim measures in emergency situations, although such power had not been specifically conferred to it in the Treaty.2 0 The Court based its decision on
the Commission's need to administer the Community's competition policy effectively.2 1 Despite this broad grant of injunctive power, the Commission seldom uses these measures.2 2 Only recently has the Commission elected to apply its power of ordering interim measures.23 It has
never used interim measures, however, to prohibit mergers. 2 '
B.

ANALYSIS: INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MERGER

CONTROL

1. Substantive Defects
There are both substantive and procedural weaknesses in the current
system of merger control under article 86. Substantively, the current
system lacks legal certainty. Businesses are entitled to know when their
actions will come within the purview of article 86.25 Unfortunately,
there has been no direct application of article 86 to mergers for more
than thirteen years.2 6 The one decision rendered, Continental Can, has
attempted to conform their agreement to avoid the implication of articles 85 and 86).
19. Camara Care, Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, 131, 1
Comm. Mkt. L. R. 334 (stating that the power to grant interim measures stems from
article 3(1) of Regulation 17).
20. Id. at 129-31.
21. Id. at 131.
22. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 426; see also infra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text (explaining the reasons for the Commission's reluctance to use these interim
measures).
23. See Commission Decision of 18 August 1982, Interim Measure, 82/628/EEC,
Distribution System of Ford Wenke AG, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 256) 20 (1982)
(relying on article 85 to impose an order to protect parallel imports of Ford products);
Commission Decision of 2 July 1984, 84/379/EEC, British Leyland case, 27 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 207) 11 (1984) (relying on article 86 to stop British Leyland from
impeding imports through its monopoly on granting certificates of conformity).
24. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 415.
25. See Regulation 17, supra note 12, preamble (in English translation at 20)
(stating: "Whereas it may be in the interest of undertakings to know whether any
agreements, decisions or practices to which they are party or propose to become party,
may lead to action on the part of the Commission pursuant to Article 85(1) or Article
86 . .

26.

").
THIRTY YEARS,

supra note 2, at 349 (1983); Reynolds, supra note 2, at 411.
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been severely criticized for being inconsistent,27 ambiguousm and unrealistic.29 Consequently, enterprises considering possible mergers or
acquisitions are left with little antitrust guidance. 30
Another serious substantive problem with article 86 is the absence of
a mechanism that allows the Commission to determine a merger's compatibility with other Community goals."' The Community's competition
policy has two objectives. While the Commission seeks to promote competition within the Community, it also must help promote the integration of separate economies into a unified common market. 2 Because
the latter objective is considered more important, 33 it follows that
27. See Kamp supra note 14, at 155 (observing that because the use of article 86
to control mergers requires that one firm maintain a dominant position prior to the
merger, it is possible for two non-dominant firms with a substantial share of the market
to merge legally); D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 6, at 318 (noting that
under Continental Can's requirement for preexisting dominant position, while a merger
can seriously restrict competition and make further concentration inevitable, article 86
would remain inapplicable as long as the firms fall short of market dominance); Sherlinker, Merger Regulation in the E.E.C., 134 NEW. L. J. 809 (1984) [hereinafter Sherlinker] (noting that not every merger that adversely affects the Community's competition and trade involves enterprises that are dominant within the meaning of article 86).
The absolute requirement that one of the firms be in a dominant position creates an
almost insurmountable evidentiary obstacle for the Commission. U.P. TOEPKE, E.E.C.
COMPETITION LAW: BUSINESS ISSUES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN COMMON MARKET
ANTITRUST CASES 127 (1982). This is particularly true since the Commission itself is
not certain what constitutes a dominant position. Compare TENTH REPORT, supra note
7, at point 150 (stating that a dominant position usually occurs when a market share of
40% to 45% has been reached) with NINTH REPORT, supra note 16, at point 127 (stating that a dominant position did not exist when the market share reached 20%).
Moreover, the fact that any merger agreement, no matter how honestly entered into
will be an "abuse" if undertaken by a .dominant firm, ignores the implicit meaning of
the provision. See J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 244 (Supplement 1975) [hereinafter J. CUNNINGHAM] (stating
that the words "[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market" strongly suggest that a violation may only occur when market
strength is used as an instrument and in a reprehensible manner).
28. Heil & Vorbrugg, Anti-trust in West Germany: Recent Developments in German and Common Market Regulation, 8 INT'L LAW. 349, 383 (1974) (noting that
when the Court had to apply article 86 to mergers it was forced to make a teleological
interpretation of the antitrust sections of the Treaty of Rome, looking not just to the
strict wording of article 86, but to the broader aims of the Treaty itself). Such interpretative approaches, however, create legal ambiguities due to the difficulties experienced
by firms when attempting to interpret the vague objectives of the Treaty. Id.
29. See Kamp, supra note 14, at 155 (maintaining that because in real competition
all firms are always somewhat dependent on one another, the Court's test requiring
independent behavior as a determinant of dominant market position was unrealistic).
30. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 413.
31. See Proposal, supra note 1, preamble (stating that the duties of the Commission should include the right to examine the compatibility of a merger with other Community goals).
32. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTiTRUST. A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 423 (1979) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE GUIDE].
33. Id.
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where a normally anticompetitive merger may help foster a stronger,
more integrated common market, the Commission should refrain from
invalidating the merger. 4 Similarly, where a merger that is otherwise
considered anticompetitive may help promote certain social or non-economic goals of the Community, the Commission should exempt it from
invalidation.3 5 The Commission has stated its willingness to recognize
such merger exemptions under the current system of merger control,30
but it appears that there is little room for such subjective analysis
under the objective article 86 analytical standard adopted in HoffmanLaRoche v. Commission.37 Consequently, article 86's merger control
provisions do not provide a sufficient policy framework to allow the
Commission to balance the competitive impact of a proposed merger
with the higher ideal of Community integration. 8
2. Procedural Defects
The fundamental procedural flaw of the current merger control system under the authority of the Continental Can is that article 86 does
not provide any mechanisms or provisions to prevent mergers prior to
consolidation. Consequently, the Commission can only find a violation
34. See Kamp, supra note 14, at 151 (stating that integration is a very important
Community objective and that the Commission had originally encouraged transnational
mergers because of their potential to improve technology, productivity, efficiency, and
competition). This position was laid out in the Commission's Memorandum on Concentrations, published as Problems of Concentration in the Common Market: E.E.C.
Study (Competition Series No. 3) 5-8 (1966), cited in Kamp, supra note 14, at 151.
35. See Proposal, supra note 1, at preamble (expressing the attitude that certain
social or non-economic goals are more important than preservation of competition); see
also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION

POLICY, point 29, (1974) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT] (stating that the goal of the
Proposal's exemption provision was to take into account certain requirements of industrial, technological, social, or regional policy objectives of the Community).
36. TENTH REPORT, supra note 7, at point 21.
37. D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 6, at 306; Reynolds, supra note 2, at
415. Accordingly, in Hoffman-LaRoche, the Court stated:
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of
a market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question,
the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services
on the basis of the transactions of the commercial operators, has the effect of
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.
Hoffman-LaRoche v. Commission, Case No. 85/76, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461,
541. But see D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 6, at 306 (commenting on how
General Motors Continental, Case No. 26/75, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1367, at
1379-80, reflects the Court's willingness to examine certain subjective factors in determining the abusive quality of an act).
38. D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 6, at 318.
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of article 86 after the merger has been consummated, thus limiting the
remedy to divestiture, an extremely costly and wasteful solution. Despite the apparent efficiency of such premerger evaluation procedures
such as the use of informal opinions and interim measures, serious defects persist. Informal opinions that merging companies solicit from the
Commission are often inadequate. The fundamental problem with the
informal opinion approach is that it relies on the prudence of the undertakings. Merging firms are not statutorily required to notify the
Commission before their consolidation. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Commission's preliminary opinions are usually based on
insufficient market analysis.3" The Commission has no incentive to
make such an analysis because it is not compelled to justify its
opinions. 40
The use of interim measures as a source of premerger control poses a
different problem. Although these measures provide the Commission
with a potentially effective tool for controlling mergers, the Commission has consistently refused to employ them. 41 This reluctance stems
from the high burden of proof required for application of the measure. 42 The party seeking the injunction must make a reasonably strong
primafacie showing that there has been a violation of the competition
rules of the EEC. 43 The stringency of this test is likely to inhibit market competitors from attempting to prove that interim action is warranted." Some commentators believe, however, that the Commission
can effectively use its power to protect the "public interest.", Nevertheless, the Commission continues to use the measure sparingly.'
39. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 414 (stating that the Commission may not have
made an appropriately thorough market analysis in a number of instances).
40. Id. A thorough analysis is required only if the decision is appealed. Id.
41. Id. at 415.
42. Id. at 415-16.
43. See Practice Note: Applications to the E.C. Commission for Interim Measures
under Article 3 of Regulation 17, [1980] 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 369 (describing the
burden of proof placed on the plaintiff). The Note states:
(1) there must be a reasonably strong primafacie case that there has been a
violation of the Treaty;
(2) interim measures must be urgently needed;
(3) they must be needed to avoid a situation which is likely to cause serious and
irreparable damage to the party seeking their adoption, or which is intolerable
for the public interest.
Id.
44. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 416.
45. See Lang, The Powers of the Commission to Order Interim Measures in Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 49, 54 (1981) (emphasizing the importance
for the Commission to stress public interest in enjoining a merger).
46. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 415; COMMssIoN OF THE EUROPEAN CoMIiMuNrMEs,
FIFTEENTH REPORT OF COMPErTION POUCY,point 49 (1986) [hereinafter FiFrENm
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When it finally did utilize the interim measure in its action against
Ford,4 7 the European Court concluded that the Commission had decided the matter on very narrow grounds. 48 Hence, the prospect of the
Commission using interim measures to regulate mergers a priori is
uncertain. 9
II. THE PROPOSED MERGER REGULATION
A.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSAL

In the early seventies the need for premerger control became particularly great as the number of concentrations increased substantially. 0
Shortly after Continental Can, the Commission drafted a proposal to
provide for more systematic control over concentrations. The Proposal
gained support from both the European Parliament" and the Economic
and Social Committee.52 Despite an agreement in principle on the need
for such control, many member states expressed skepticism on a number of issues.53 Consequently, the Proposal has been amended twice
REPORT]. Recently, however, the Commission has shown more flexibility in commencing interim measure proceedings. In 1985, it instituted such proceedings against Hilti,
Inc., a large Liechtenstein trading company which allegedly enjoyed a dominant position for "nail-guns" in various regions of the Community, for tying the supply of their
cartridge magazines to Hilti nails, thus having a considerable impact on the complainants' ability to compete. After the action was commenced, Hilti formally undertook to
stop the tying agreement. Id.
47. (1) Ford-Werke, A.G., (2) Ford of Europe v. Commission, Case No. 18/85,
decided Sept. 17, 1985, cited in Proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, Sept. 16-20, 1985.
48. A. Burnside, Enforcement of the EEC Competition Law by Interim Measures,
19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 34, 53 (1985) (describing how the Court held that the Commission erred in granting an interim measure against Ford of West Germany because it
only reviewed the specific act of refusing to sell steering wheels instead of analyzing the
nature of the entire underlying agreement that was the selective distribution process).
49. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 417.
50. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 34, at point 22, 27 (discussing the need to
control mergers); see also Rahl, Competition and Antitrust in American Economic
Policy: Are There Useful Lessons for Europe?, 8 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 284, 291
(1971) [hereinafter Rahl] (expressing the fear that the EEC was following the United
States trend toward a more oligopolistic market structure and that a policy framework
should therefore be employed to disperse this structure). See generally Joliet, Der
Begriff des Missbr auchlichen Ausnutzung in Artikel 86 EWG-Vertrag (The Concept
of Abusive Exploitation in Article 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty), 8 EUROPARECHT 120
(1973) (expressing concern over the Commission's inability to control mergers a priori
and the need for premerger scrutiny as impetus for adopting the Merger Regulation
Proposal); Proposal, supra note 1, preamble (explaining the need to control mergers).
51. European Parliament, 1973-1976 Session, Minutes of Sitting, 11 February
1974, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 25) 1, 5 (1974).
52. Consultation of the Economic and Social Committee (on the control of concentrations between undertakings), 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 88) 19, 20 (1974).
53. See Dutch Sanitary Ware Cartel Prohibited, [1973-75 Transfer Binder] Coin-
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during the past thirteen years.
All Commission proposals must have a legal basis in the Treaty of
Rome.M The Commission elected to use both articles 8765 and 2350 as
the basis of the merger Proposal. Article 87 provides the Council with
the specific authority to implement the antitrust provisions of articles
85 and 86 while article 235 grants the Council the general power to
ensure that Community objectives, as expressed in article 3 of the
Treaty, are achieved. Thus, the merger proposal was formulated to ensure that economic competition in the Community was "not distorted. 57 The purpose of the Proposal is to prevent mergers that may
hinder competition while encouraging mergers that promote competition or other Community objectives.58 Small mergers or mergers forged
in highly competitive international industries may support the unified
common market objective, but large mergers are typically considered
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) D 9545 (1974) (providing a brief summary of the arguments
made by the opponents of the Proposal).
54. R. PLENDER
PEAN COMMUNiTiES

&

T. USHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE EURO-

64 (1980) [hereinafter R. PLENDER & T. USHER]. Institutions of
the European Community have no general legislative powers. "They may make laws
only in those instances in which the power to do so is conferred on them by specific
articles of the Community's treaties." Id. at 53. Both article 189 and 190 of the Treaty
of Rome require that institutional legislation refer back to a Treaty provision. See
Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 189 (stating that "[i]n order to carry out their
task the Council and Commission shall, in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or
deliver opinions . . . "); id. at art. 190 (declaring that "[r]egulations, directives, and
decisions of the Council and of the Commission shall state reasons on which they are
based and shall refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained
pursuant to this Treaty").
55. See supra note 11 (providing the text of article 87).
56. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 235. The relevant provision states:
If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning
of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community in cases where
this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on the proposal of the Commission and after
the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions.

Id.

57. Id. at art. 3(f) (explaining that "the activities of the Community shall include
...the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in
the Common Market"). This article sets forth the objectives that the Commission is to
achieve under article 235.
58. See TmiRD REPORT, supra note 35, at point 27 (discussing the need to control
mergers); COMPARATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 763 (referring to the Proposal and
commenting on its goals); see also Proposal, supra note 1, preamble (outlining the
intentions of the Proposal). These goals reflect the Community's dual objective competition policy. See COMPARATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 768 (describing the need for
the Community to promote intercommunity economic objectives while simultaneously
assisting in activities that provide intangible political and social benefits); see supra
notes 31-36 and accompanying text (explaining the two concurrent goals of the Community's antitrust policy).
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more likely to obstruct competition within the community. 5 To accomplish its purpose, the Proposal establishes a format that enables more
systematic identification of undesirable mergers. Although the Proposal
has been amended twice, this goal of achieving a clear delineation between "good" and "bad" mergers remains unchanged. 0
The Proposal contains specific criteria for the Commission to use to
evaluate the legitimacy of mergers. The Proposal first prescribes certain quantitative thresholds below which a Community level merger
control will not apply. These thresholds are based on the aggregate
turnover and market shares of the firms.6 ' Once a merger has qualified
for administrative scrutiny, the Commission uses a bifurcated analysis
to judge the legitimacy of the concentration: (1) pursuant to article
1(1) the Commission must decide whether the merger will "hinder effective competition in the common market or a substantial part
thereof"; 2 and (2) pursuant to article 1(3) the Commission must then
determine whether the merger is somehow "indispensable to the attainment of priority of the Community.""3
The original Proposal sat idly for almost eight years 64 before the
Commission, acting on a resolution of the Parliament, 5 resubmitted a
59. Hawk, Antitrust in the EEC-The First Decade, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 229, 243
(1972); Note, Common Market Merger Policy: Sources and Development, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 501, 510 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Sources and Development].
60. See 1982-1983 EUR. PARL. DEB. (No. 1-305) 25, 32 (1983) [hereinafter DEBATES] (providing remarks by Mr. Tugendhat, Vice-President of the Commission on
the current unclear delineation between beneficial and harmful mergers).
61. See 1984 Amendment to the Proposal (Submitted by the Commission on February 7, 1984), 27 0.3. EUR. COMM. (No. C 51) art. 1(2), at 9 (1984) [hereinafter
Proposal III] (noting that under article 1(2) the Commission will only challenge a
merger if the combined aggregate turnover of the merging firms exceeds 750 million
ECU or their combined share of the common market is greater than 50%). The current
proposal also establishes a presumption of compatibility for undertakings whose goods
or services account for less than 20% of turnover in identical goods and services in a
substantial part of the common market. Id. at art. 1(1). Consequently, aggregate turnover statistics remain the fundamental threshold criteria while measurements regarding
market share are to be used simply as one assessment factor among many in determining the applicability of the Proposal. See Proposal II, infra note 66, at 4.
62. Id. at art. 1(1). Article 1(1) states:
The power to hinder effective competition shall be appraised at Community level
and by reference in particular to the extent to which suppliers and consumers
have a possibility of choice, to the economic and financial power of the undertakings concerned, to the structure of the markets affected, to international competition, and to supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services.
Id.
63. Id. at art. 1(3).
64. See van Kraay, Competition and Industrial Policy, 2 EUR. L. REv. 54 (1977)
[hereinafter van Kraay] (reviewing the historical development of the Merger Proposal
prior to 1977).
65. Resolution on Industrial Cooperation Between the Member States, 24 O.J.

1987]

EC MERGER CONTROL

revised version of the Proposal to the Council. 6 Addressing the concerns of the Council members, the amended Proposal attempted to
limit the scope of the Regulations to mergers of a Community dimension and to obtain greater involvement of the Member States in the
decision-making process.
Most of the changes embodied in the
amendment affected parts of article 1, dealing with the Proposal's general scope, and article 19, pertaining to the relationship between the
Commission and the relevant authorities of the Member States in the
decision-making process. Under the amended version of article 1, the
Commission broadened and clarified the purview of the assessment criteria, noting that appraisal of the merged firm's market power should
take place at the Community level and that it should consider the effects of international competition within the particular industry.6" Also,
the amendment limited the use of market share criteria to an assessment factor, rather than an assessment threshold. 0
The revised version of article 19 both broadened the powers of the
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions70
as a consultant and established new means for the Council to voice its
opinions regarding a priority objective within the meaning of article
1(3).71 Under the new procedure, a Member State would have an opportunity to state its opinion concerning whether the Commission
should grant an exemption to the proposed merger under article 1(3).2
Despite these amendments, the Council did not endorse the Proposal.
A few years later, the Parliament 3 and the Economic and Social ComEUR. COMM. (No. C 144) 60, 65 (1981).

66. Amended Proposalfor a Council Regulation (submitted by the Commission on
16 December 1981), 25 O.J. EuR. COM. (No. C 36) 3 (1982) [hereinafter Proposal

II].

67. See id. (discussing the general goals of the revision).
68. Id. at art. 1(1).
69. See id. at 4 (amending the first Proposal to utilize the market share criterion as
one element in the analysis of whether a merger threatens to eliminate competition).
70. Id. at art. 19(3)(4). The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and
Dominant Positions is composed of an official from each Member State. Id.
71. Id. at art. 19, §§ 3, 4, 7, 8. These provisions provide a means for both Member
States and the Council to have input in the determination of whether a certain violative
merger warrants a priority exemption. As it exists now, the Advisory Committee can
oppose a Commission recommendation. Id. If a majority of its members do oppose a
recommendation, the Commission cannot adopt the decision for twenty days, during
which time a Member State may identify a benefit it feels merits consideration and
present it to the Council. Id. The Commission then considers the Council's opinion in
making its final decision on whether to permit the proposed merger. Id.
72. Id.
73. Regulation on the Control of Concentrations, 26 O.J. EUR. CoMMb. (No. C 322)
26, 31 (1983) [hereinafter Parliament].
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mittee 74 of the Community suggested additional changes to break the
deadlock. The Commission responded, amending the Proposal again in
1984.71 Although the Commission accepted the suggestions relating to
the issuance of policy guidelines for businesses7" and the reevaluation
of the assessment and turnover criteria,7 it refused to adopt the recommendation concerning the duplication of control over transfrontier
concentration. 8
B.

ANALYSIS

Since its inception, the Proposal for merger regulation has been criticized on a number of different grounds. Although the passage of time
and the adoption of amendments have diffused much of the original
criticism, there are several aspects of the Proposal that still elicit strong
disapproval. Among these are the legal validity of the Regulation and
the adequacy of both the threshold and substantive criteria used in
evaluating mergers.
74. Opinion on the Amendment to the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Control of Concentrations, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 252) 15, 16 (1982) [hereinafter Amendment Opinion].
75.
76.

Proposal III, supra note 61.
Parliament, supra note 73, at 31 (emphasizing the need for the Commission to

periodically issue guidelines on merger policy to the business community); see also
1982-1983 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-807) 13 [hereinafter Working Document] (explaining Parliament's position on the need to keep the business community informed).
77. See Parliament, supra note 73, at 31 (recommending that to qualify for substantive scrutiny the aggregate turnover for both firms exceed 750 million ECU); DEBATES, supra note 60, at 24 (providing a rationale as to why such a high threshold is
required before a merger is challenged).
Similarly, the Commission accepted the Parliament's suggestion that it amend article
1(1) and separately consider the issue of international competition in appraising corporations' power to hinder competition. See Proposal II, supra note 66, at art. 1(1), para.
2 (focusing on the competition itself and no longer on the "effects" of international
competition); Working Document, supra note 76, at 14 (describing the rationale for
Parliament's position that international competition is an important factor in determining the effect of a proposed merger on the Community).
78. Proposal II, supra note 66. Members of the Parliament argued that the Commission should exclusively regulate mergers at the Community level. See generally Debates, supra note 60, at 24-31 (discussing benefits of allowing the Commission to have
sole capacity to intervene and act regarding a merger); Working Document, supra note
76, at 15 (describing the advantages to permitting the Commission alone to make article I determinations). They advised the Commission to withdraw the last half of articles 19(2) and 19(8). DEBATES, supra note 60, at 32-33. The Commission believed,
however, that the Council would never approve the Proposal if certain supervisory
rights to Member States were not provided. Id.
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The Legal Basis of the Proposal

Although of less importance today, 79 the issue surrounding the Regulation's legal validity warrants brief consideration. Attention is merited
because the issue has never been decisively resolved 0 and thus it is
possible that should the Regulation become operative, critics would

question the Regulation's legal validity.81
A general consideration of article 235 does not reveal apparent
problems using the article as a basis for the Proposal. Nevertheless, a
close examination of the article's wording reveals an inconsistency. Article 235 declares that the Community may act to achieve one of its
objectives only when the Treaty of Rome has not already provided such
powers.8 2 Some argue that because the Court of Justice ruled that the
Commission may use article 86 to control mergers, the "requisite powers of action" have already been provided.83 Therefore, article 235 and
Continental Can, when read together, imply that circumvention of the
limited use of article 86 in controlling mergers is impermissible."
This concern over the Proposal's legal validity is, however, illfounded. The Court has interpreted article 235 of the Treaty broadly,
stating that it gives the Council the authority to take action in situa79. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 7, at point 20 (providing the Commission's
opinion that the Proposal should be based not solely on article 87, but also on article
235). It is unlikely that anyone will raise the issue again before a final decision on the
entire Proposal is taken. Interview with M. Lodewijk Briet, Second Secretary of Commercial Affairs for the European Community, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 9, 1986)
[hereinafter Interview].
80. See Comment, Proposed E.E.C. Regulation on the Control of Mergers, 26
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 468, 478 (1977) (arguing that the failure to resolve the legal
validity issue is due to the recognition that the question merely conceals political disputes); Interview, supra note 79 (acknowledging that real national political disputes are
often disguised in lesser technical disagreements about such things as questions of Proposal validity).
81. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 177(l) (defining the scope of the
Court's powers in reviewing the validity of EEC institutional acts). Pursuant to the
Treaty of Rome, any entity affected by a Commission Regulation or Directive may
raise the issue of its legal validity with the European Court of Justice. Id.
82. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 235. See supra note 56 (providing the
text of the relevant provision).
83. M. Mok, Social Economische Wetgeving, May 5, 1973, at 361, cited in Comment, Proposed E.E.C. Regulation on Control of Mergers, 26 INTL & CoNIP. L. Q.
468, 477 (1977).
84. See Adler & Belman, The EEC's Proposalfor a Regulation on the Controlof
ConcentrationsBetween Undertakings,8 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 267, 274 (1973) [hereinafter Adler & Belman] (giving merit to a strict reading of article 235 and maintaining
the validity of the article as a legal basis could vastly expand the powers of the Commission and the Council by allowing these bodies to ignore the restrictive clauses of the
Community's constitution though reliance on the amorphous wording of article 235).
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tions even if no other Treaty provision confers the necessary powers.8s
In Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, GmbI-I 8 a Council regulation had been adopted to address the administration of a customs union between member states leaving the Court to decide whether
article 235 provided authority to enact the Regulation. Some contended
that because other Treaty provisions already established exclusive rules
for the implementation of a customs union, use of article 235 was prohibited. 87 The Court held that article 235 was suitable as a legal basis
because the Treaty's provisions conferring regulatory power over customs unions to the Council were too vague and could not furnish the
Council with an adequate basis for action.8 8 The language of article 86
is equally vague. From an examination of the text of the article, it is
entirely unclear how the article will adequately control mergers.89 Pursuant to the reasoning of Hauptzollamt,0 article 235 could provide a
sufficient legal basis for action. Given the logic and precedent of the
Hauptzollamt argument, any contention challenging the legal basis of
such regulations is groundless.
2.

The Threshold Criterion

Before subjection to a qualitative examination under article 1(1) and
1(3), a merger must meet a quantitative test under article 1(2) and
article 4 of the Proposal. Article 1(2) creates a minimum threshold of
Regulation applicability9 1, while article 4 establishes which firms are
expressly required to notify the Commission prior to the consummation
of a merger.9 2
85. R. PLENDER & T. USHER, supra note 54, at 64. In discussing Hauptzollamt
Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, GmbH, infra note 86, the authors state that article
235 enlarges the powers of EC institutions thereby giving the Council the power to take
action in certain circumstances even though no other Treaty article has conferred the
necessary powers. Id.
86. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, GmbH, Case No. 8/73, 1973
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 897.
87. See R. PLENDER & T. USHER, supra note 54, at 64 (reiterating the argument
in Massey-Ferguson).
88. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson, GmbH, Case No. 8/73, 1973
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 908.
89. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text (explaining the many inadequacies of applying the language of article 86 to mergers).
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (providing the holding of Massey
Ferguson).
91. See Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (exempting from article 1(I) scrutiny
those mergers whose undertakings show an aggregate turnover of less than 750 million
ECU unless "the share in a substantial part of the Common Market is greater than
50%. .. ").
92. See id. at art. 4 (stating that if the aggregate turnover of an undertaking con-
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In analyzing the effectiveness of the Proposal's threshold criteria, it
is important to recognize the underlying policies behind numerical delineations. There are two reasons for adopting objective divisions between allowable and potentially harmful concentrations. Providing legal
certainty for the business community is a primary objective.03 Such
predictability is a prerequisite for informed corporate decision-making." An additional purpose for establishing these objectives is to provide greater administrative ease for the Commission.The current quantitative thresholds serve these purposes well. While the criterion
already affords more legal certainty than article 86 provides, the Commission has further provided, through its amendments, predictability
within the Proposal. The original Proposal used a twenty-five percent
market share criterion as a threshold measure.9 5 Following the 1981
amendments, market share merely represents one among many assessment factors. 8 The rationale behind this change is that it is extremely
difficult for either the undertaking or the Commission to ascertain the
correct measure of a firm's market share. 7 Moreover, making an informed estimate requires extensive market analysis; something that is
difficult to achieve at the national level, and even more difficult at the
Community level."8 Overall, by removing the market share measure
from the threshold criterion, the Commission reduced the administrative burden and created greater legal certainty for the undertakings.
The Commission increased the turnover threshold from 500 million
cerned is more than 1000 million ECU, the undertaking must notify the Commission,
unless the other undertaking(s) has a turnover of less than 30 million ECU, in which
case the merger is exempt from the notification requirement).
93. Working Document, supra note 76, at 14. In a report drawn up on behalf of
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs for the European Parliament concerning merger control, the Committee stated: "Legal certainty as to the application of
the criteria being put into effect [and] . . . predetermined procedures

. . .

must be

ensured where the controlling authorities intervene in the interests of flexibility of undertakings' prerequisite for international competitiveness." Id.
94. See Regulation 17, supra note 12, preamble (recognizing predictability as a
necessary requirement for informed corporate decision-making).
95. Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 1(2).
96. Proposal II, supra note 66, at 4.
97. Id.; see also DEBATES, supra note 60, at 25 (providing comments on the use of
market share as a criterion for approval of a proposed merger). Mr. von Bismarck, the
rapporteur of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which evaluated the
status of the Proposal stated:
It is impossible to tell straight away from newspaper articles and reports what a
firm's market share is. Further investigations have to be made before this question can really be answered .

. .

. It is clear that turnover is the applicable crite-

rion, but market share as the assessment criterion is not considered until it comes
to taking action.
Id.
98. Proposal II, supra note 66, at 4.

282
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to 750 million ECU, improving the legal certainty of article 1(2). In so
doing, the Commission narrowed the gap between mandatory premerger notification under article 4 (1000 million ECU) and the maximum turnover exemption (presently 750 million ECU). Reducing the
zone of uncertainty from 500 million ECU to 250 million ECU creates
greater predictability for merging companies.
The Amendment raising the turnover threshold also would improve
the efficiency of the Proposal's administration. Raising the article 1(2)
turnover number, the Commission would reduce the number of mergers
it needs to scrutinize. 9 The Commission would examine only those
mergers that are "the largest and most anti-competitive." 00 Because it
would not evaluate as many mergers, the Commission could test the
effectiveness of its reviewing power. 1' 0 If the initial experience showed
the Directorate General IV of the Commission 0 2 administratively capable of handling the workload, the Member States0 3 could lower the
threshold to bring more mergers under its scrutiny.1
The Community should maintain the Proposal's current turnover
numbers, used as qualifying standards for the Commission, to examine
or exempt possible mergers. The standards are based on careful economic and political calculation.1 04 While any threshold the Commission
establishes is subject to debate, the numerical cut-offs in this instance
not only serve their important economic functions of affording legal
certainty and administrative ease, but also represent political
99. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 24-25 (providing remarks on the justification
for 750 million ECU). Again, Mr. von Bismarck commented: "At first, 200 million
ECU was considered appropriate, then 500 million ECU, and we finally agreed on 750
million ECU. Why? Because we believe that transfrontier control is something new
which will pose new problems for the Commission and we should avoid overtaxing
them." Id.
100. See id. at 24 (furnishing opinions that the real purpose of the Proposal is to
preclude only the very largest mergers and that the new Proposal better accomplishes
this task).
101. Id. at 29.
102. There are twenty different Directorate General offices within the E.C. Commission, each supervising a different aspect of E.C. law. Directorate General IV [hereinafter DG IV] regulates E.C. competition policy. DG IV is subdivided into four offices. Directorate A supervises general competition policy. Directorates B and C
attempt to control restrictive practices and abuses of dominant position according to
various industries (the latter overseeing ECSC industries). Directorate D is responsible
for coordinating the various competition decisions.
103. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 24 (suggesting that the Commission's decision
to raise the turnover would overcome many objections of Member States if done in a
limited period of 5 to 10 years).
104. See id. at 29 (discussing the market analysis the Commission used to determine whether the raising of the article 1(2) threshold from 250 to 500 ECU and from
500 to 750 ECU would exclude relatively few enterprises).
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compromise.10 5
Like the thresholds established in article 1(2), the numerical standards of article 4(1) effectively support the underlying policies behind
such criteria.10 6 Article 4's premerger notification requirement, however, is the starting point of a long, protracted decision-making process.
Article 4's subsequent decision-making procedure regarding this notification negates the benefits that a quantitative threshold may bring to
the undertakings involved.
The Commission is only obliged to commence its investigation of the
proposed merger within three months of the parties' notification. 107 The
three-month period begins to run from the date that the Commission
receives complete information from the undertaking. The potential
problem here is that the meaning of "complete" information is never
articulated. Consequently, the Commission is at liberty to request more
information at any time, and the notifying undertakings will never
know when formal examination begins.1 "" This ambiguity renders the
grace period inoperative. Even after the Commission has all the information, it has nine additional months to render a final decision.100
These delays may substantially harm the bargaining power of the
companies involved. As Italy continually points out, such delays only
enhance the possibility that the merger rumors are leaked to the public.110 In a takeover situation, for example, this will give speculators a
chance to purchase shares of the target company thereby bidding up its
price and making the venture less attractive to the purchasing enterprise. Moreover, such rumors seriously jeopardize third party contractual relations and may cause key management personnel to desert the
target undertakings.'
Although the Commission's use of the article 1(2) threshold criteria
satisfies the policy objectives of promoting legal certainty and administrative efficiency, article 4 utilizes a procedure that is counterproductive to these objectives. Ironically, in supplying the Commission with
105.

See id. at 25 (noting von Bismarck's remark that one way to overcome all

kinds of objections from Member States is to raise the amount to 1000 ECU for a
limited period).
106. On the surface, the quantitative criteria provide legal certainty and administrative ease. The specific numerical cut-off relieves the Commission of the burden of
reviewing all premerger notifications. Moreover, potential merging undertakings are
thus put on notice as to when they must notify the Commission.
107. Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 6(2).
108. See Sherlinker, supra note 27, at 810 (discussing possible effects of failing to
define more clearly the meaning of "complete").
109. Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 17(1).
110. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 421-22.
111. Sherlinker, supra note 27, at 811.
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too much administrative flexibility, the Proposal severely jeopardizes
the legal certainty that the thresholds were designed to ensure. An un-

dertaking that is required under article 4 to notify the Commission of a
proposed merger may clearly understand this notification requirement,
but the company will have no way of knowing what information it is
required to disclose or when the Commission will issue its decision regarding the merger's validity.
3. Substantive Criteria
Apart from the Proposal's procedural problems, substantive weaknesses that threaten successful adoption of the Proposal also exist. Article 1(1) is criticized as fatally ambiguous.
Under article 1(1), if a
firm engages in a transaction that gives it the power to hinder competition and thus attain a dominant position, its actions are incompatible
with the Common Market and the Commission will prohibit any
merger attempt.1 1 3 Such a standard is lower than both the requirements under the United States Clayton Act 114 and the prior test under
Continental Can.116
Because of its unclear application 1 6 a number of suggestions have
been proposed to amend article 1(1). 11 7 One suggestion is to amend
article 1(1) to parallel closely rules used by the United States Depart112. See Note, Sources and Development, supra note 59, at 522-24 (criticizing the
proposed regulation for its "flexible non-specificity").
113. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 28 (providing observations that article l(l)'s
dominant position criterion is unclear because it is uncertain whether dominant positions are illegal or whether only those created by mergers are illegal).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), at § 13 (requiring actual market effect before the
Department of Justice will challenge).
115. See Note, Sources and Development, supra note 59, at 522-24 (distinguishing
alternative merger standards from the Proposal's article I(1) standard). Article 1(1)
differs from both the Clayton Act and the holding in Continental Can in that: (1) the
Clayton Act requires that a merger "substantially lessen" competition; and (2) Continental Can requires actual impairment of competition inasmuch as the degree of dominance achieved by the dominant firm substantially fetters competition. Id.
Indeed, where the Commission has responded to the vague standard allegation, it
justifies the ambiguity in article 1 (1) by citing the need to intervene in situations where
potentially harmful structural changes may occur. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 3132 (furnishing Tugendhat's belief that the Commission must have the power to intervene to regulate merger activity effectively). In other words, the Commission argues
that it must have the ability to determine when dominant position alone would jeopardize competition in a particular market. Id.
116. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 28 (providing an observation that the Commission has the obligation to codify its own behavior and that it must recognize the
need for rules that would provide predictability for potential merging companies).
117. See supra note 62 (outlining article 1(I)).
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ment of Justice (the "Baxter Rules")."1 ' The Department of Justice's
merger guidelines are successful in reducing litigation in the United
States.11 9

Discussions on the vagueness of article 1(3) lead to a broader, more
fundamental search for the proper role of certain decision-making bodies in the Community. While it is clear that "Community priorities"
relate to preferred industrial, technological, or regional policies,120 it is
not so obvious which of the governing organs of the Community is responsible for defining those priorities. Consequently, a substantial dispute arises between the Commission and some member states in the
Council concerning their respective roles in deciding the "indispensability" question under article 1(3).121
The Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee take the
position that the Commission should independently decide the article
1(3) exemption issue.1 22 One argument in favor of the independent decision is that individual member state delegates in the Council do not
possess the requisite objectivity necessary to render opinions for the
Community as a whole.12 3 Another argument is that to allow the Council and the Commission dual control places a heavy administrative burden on the undertakings involved and could lead to contradictory decisions and greater legal uncertainty. 2 4 The Commission disfavors the
joint decision-making structure 25 but is forced to accept the present
118. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 27-28 (criticizing the Proposal's evaluation
criteria and urging the Commission to go further and produce a set of guidelines similar to the "Baxter Rules" antitrust guidelines followed by the United States Department of Justice).
119. Id. It is also possible that this reduction in litigation is attributable to the
more lenient antitrust policies of the Reagan Administration. See More Lenient on
Antitrust-Federal Merger Policies, L.A. Daily Journal, June 22, 1982, at 4, col. I (noting this Administration's more lenient attitude toward merger control and antitrust).
120. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 35, at point 29 (referring to the purposes of
article 1 regarding competition and the Community's overall priorities).
121. See J. Weiler, Discussion Report in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL 208 (K.
Hopt ed. 1982) [hereinafter Discussion Report] (observing that the decision concerning which organ should make non-economic decisions under the Proposal remains one
of the major obstacles to the Proposal's ratification).
122. Parliament, supra note 73, at 31; Amendment Opinion, supra note 74, at 17.
123. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 25 (furnishing von Bismarck's clarification of
the Parliament's position). Von Bismarck stated:
If we involve politicians at a national level, we well know the pressure that is
brought to bear on them, as in the case of subsidies, and we consider it important
for the Commission to be accountable to the Court of Justice and not to Council
members delegated by the national parliaments who cannot champion a cause,
but must vote in such a way that they retain their positions ...
Id.
124. Id. at 29-30.
125. See id. at 32 (providing Tugendhat's statement that the Commission supports

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 2:265

system for political reasons.1 2
Some member states concerned with the regulation of the business
interests of their nationals oppose giving the Commission full discretion
in making article 1(3) exemption decisions. These states are reluctant
to relinquish their control in the area of antitrust law that is so deeply
27
linked to their own systems of government and social policy-making.
Furthermore, member state governments with large, publicly owned
concerns are necessarily directly and indirectly involved in the operations of particular undertakings. 28 In cases in which a member state
shifts the ultimate decision-making power to an independent Community body, the state opens itself to accusations of abandoning its governmental obligations. Moreover, given the broad language of article
1(3) concerning priority policies, it is the responsibility of the Council,
not the Commission, to prescribe Community objectives. 12 9
In response to both concerns, the Commission developed a compromise. Article 19 of the Proposal now provides that the Commission
show deference to the opinions of both the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Practices and the Council.1 30 Both
provisions provide for a "cooling-off" period during which the Commission may not render a decision. The goal of the compromise is to make
the Proposal politically palatable for the Council, while reserving sufficient authority for the Commission to direct consistent merger
13
policy. 1
Unfortunately, the 1981 revision adding sections seven and eight to
article 19 failed to resolve the underlying question of division of power
in applying article 1(3). Not only has the Council refused to accept the
Proposal, but the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee
sought the removal of the provisions. 13 2 The Council is only likely to
approve a new amendment that is politically acceptable. Therefore, ala Parliamentary amendment that would effectively provide the Commission complete
discretion with regard to article 1(3)).
126. See id. at 33 (furnishing Tugendhat's opinion that it is unrealistic not to include the Member States in some aspect of the decision-making process).
127. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 422; Discussion Report, supra note 121, at 208.
128. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 420 (using Italy as an example of a country
that has several large state held concerns).
129. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Council
possesses the legal power to influence the Commission regarding the Community's
priorities).
130. Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 19.
131. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 30 (providing Deleau's remark that the Commission acted to associate the Council more closely in the decision-making procedure
out of necessity).
132. Parliament, supra note 73, at 31; Amendment Opinion, supra note 74, at 17.
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though the Commission may agree theoretically with the Parliament
and Economic and Social Committee regarding its role as policymaker, the Committee would probably have to relinquish that role to
gain the Council's approval.
III. THE NEED FOR SYSTEMATIC MERGER CONTROL
The fact that criticisms continue to block the adoption of the Proposal is particularly alarming given the European Community's concern
over increasing merger activity. While the increase in concentration
was once seen as potentially helpful for industry in the European Community, 133 today increased concentration in many industries is deemed
undesirable.134 Because the Commission has linked increased merger
activity to increases in industry concentration, 13 any increase in industry concentration will alert the Commission to a possible increase in
merger activity.136 The two most recent Commission studies on concentrations in the Community concluded that merger activity is growing
and that there is a noticeable increase in the level of concentrations.1 37
Consequently, the Commission noted that the movement of many sectors of industry toward more oligopolistic structures necessitates fur133. See Information Memo from EEC Commission No. P-1/66, [1965-69 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) D 9081 (1966) (noting the need to foster larger
European companies through the merger process); THIRD REPORT, supra note 35, at
point 22 (explaining that a major impetus for drawing up the Proposal was concern
over increased concentration).
134. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 2, at 348-49 (stating that the subject of concentration is now critically reappraised as a result of the popular return of small and
medium sized firms).
135. FIFTEENTH REPORT, supra note 46, at point 267.
136. See Rahl, supra note 50, at 291 (describing the danger of increasing oligopolistic power and arguing that the European Community could follow the oligopolistic
trend of the United States in the 1970's if stricter, more specific merger laws are not
adopted).
137. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMuIMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY, point 294 (1983) (providing statistical data on the increase in
merger activity since 1972). According to the report, merger activity has risen sharply
over the last few years. In 1984/85 merger activity increased 34% from the 1983/84
figure of 155 total mergers. This is slightly more than last year's increase of 32% over
the 1982/83 figure. Figures in the 1984/85 Report also indicate that for the past several years, a majority of the mergers involved firms whose combined turnover was
greater than 1000 million ECU. Id. at table 3. The increase in merger activity among
these very large firms (turnover greater than 1000 million ECU) has particular significance when considering the Merger Proposal's mandatory premerger notification requirement under article 1(2) for large firms. See Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 1(2)
(stating that the Commissioner's scrutiny will begin for those firms whose combined
aggregate turnover is above 750 million ECU).
The Commission concluded from the Report's results that "the level of concentration
• .. shows a percipient, and in some cases, a marked upward trend." FIFTEENTH REPORT, supra note 46, at point 267.
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ther merger control. 13 8 As this trend toward higher industry concentration continues,'3 9 the Community is still without an effective regulatory
mechanism. 40 This Comment offers two suggestions that may aid the
Commission in acquiring better administrative control over mergers.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

SUGGESTION ONE: AMENDING THE PROPOSAL

Recognizing the current political deadlock on the Merger Control
Proposal, the Commission should make one final attempt to gain the
Council's approval. Despite its technical deficiencies, the Proposal supplies a conceptual framework that, at the very least, could become the
foundation for Community-wide concentration control.' 4 ' Until the various concerns are rectified, however, the Community will continue to
lack a viable policy dealing with mergers.
1. Revising the PremergerNotification Process
The Commission should reevaluate the procedure it presently endorses for implementing the numerical criteria set forth in article 1(2)
and article 4(1) and 4(2). The premerger procedure set forth in article
4 in conjunction with article 6 lacks a useful timetable and has been
the subject of intense criticism.' 42
Some changes have already taken place that could accelerate the decision-making process. In late 1984, the Directorate-General IV was
reorganized. 14 The purpose of the reorganization was to create a
scheme of directorates or offices that would analyze certain market activity according to their specialty industries. 44 This new organizational
FOURTEENTH REPORT, supra note 18, at point 43.
139. See Merger Mania Crosses the Atlantic, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1985, at D1,
col. 2 (describing the drastic increase in merger activity in Britain and labelling it
"merger mania"); see also id. at D2, col. 2 (explaining that certain merger and acquisition experts believe that because the British takeover rate is about eighteen months
behind that of the United States, Britain will experience a flurry of buyouts this year).

138.

140. See

THIRD REPORT,

supra note 35, at point 22 (explaining that a major impe-

tus for drawing up the Proposal was the concern over increased concentration).
141. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 420 (stating that all Member States, except
Italy, agree in principle that such control should exist at the Community level).
142. Parliament, supra note 73, at 16; see also Sherlinker, supra note 27, at 81011 (highlighting the procedural defects of the premerger notification process); COMPARATIVE

GUIDE, supra note 32, at 768 (highlighting the procedural defects of the

premerger notification process). See supra notes 107-11 (criticizing the current timetable used under article 6 of the Proposal).
143. See The Internal Reorganization of DG IV, EEC Newsletter, Brussels, 4
(Jan./Feb. 1985) (observing that the reorganization took effect on October 1, 1984).
144. See id. (providing the overall purpose of the restructuring). The newsletter
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arrangement will ideally facilitate more rapid resolution of antitrust
problems. 45 Although the effect on the Commission's performance is
still uncertain, the restructuring does signify the Commission's recognition that the old process of evaluation is inadequate and that a new,
more expeditious, system is necessary. 46
Another change that will improve the Commission's ability to tackle
premerger notifications and data accumulation is the higher numerical
threshold in article 1(2).1417 It is hoped that this change will decrease
the number of enterprises subjected to the Commission's scrutiny. In
decreasing the Commission's workload, the Commission is free to improve the quality of examinations and accelerate the dispatch of decisions. Finally, by including the term "immediately" in article 6(1), the
Commission demonstrated its commitment to improving the pace of its
1 48
decision-making.
In addition to these recent improvements, the Commission should
consider making other modifications in its procedural arrangements.
The ambiguity surrounding the phrase "complete information" in article 6(2) presents a danger that the Commission's three month grace
period allotted to the Commission will become inoperative. To prevent
this, the Commission should require the inclusion of certain minimum
data in all premerger notices, with the amount of information required
varying according to the industry. With DG IV's new organizational
structure, it is very feasible for each specialized office to devise guidelines for its respective industries. This will improve communication and
certainty and would accelerate the premerger evaluation process. Once
the proceedings commence, the Commission may compel more comstated:
[Tihe present intention with reorganizing the structure [of DG IV] will be to
develop a small group of officials who are thoroughly familiar with a limited
number of industries, sectors and markets. Through such specialization, Commission officials should be able to evaluate and analyze the cases with which they
must deal more rapidly. To avoid personal or industrial bias in the evaluation
process, the coordinating function of Directorate D-an independent body of officials who coordinate the specialty Directorates.
Id.
145. Id.
146. Interview, supra note 79.
147. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (discussing the general advantages of raising the article 1(2) threshold requirements).
148. Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 6(l). The amended version of the Proposal now
reads: "Where the Commission considers that a concentration is likely to become the
subject of a decision under Article 1(1) or (3), it shall commence proceedings immediately and so inform the undertakings in question and the competent authorities in the
Member States." Id.
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plete information when necessary. 149 Because time can unfairly advantage or disadvantage one of the merging parties, it is important for the
Commission to adopt a clear, consistent approach to premerger examinations. By accelerating and clearly defining the process, the Commission will reduce the risk of inequities being produced. Some question
the possibility of hastening the Commission's actual decision-making.150
Through the restructuring of DG IV and the change in the article 1(2)
threshold, however, a process exists in which the Commission can reach
a final decision in less than twelve months.
2. Resolving the Division of Power Issue
Despite the continued criticism that article 1(1)'s substantive standards are vague,1" the real focus of the debate concerning article 1
centers on subsection three. The division of power issue,152 implicit in
the article's exemption clause, has remained a major stumbling block in
the Proposal's approval.153 Consequently, the Commission is faced with
a dilemma. To gain the Council's necessary approval of the Proposal,
the Commission must divest itself of certain authority.'" At the present time, the Commission retains full discretion to decide the matter
of "Community priorities," although the Council and the Advisory
Committee may issue statements of opinion pursuant to article 19(7)
149. See Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 10 (explaining the Commission's procedure
for requesting additional information). The Commission may impose penalties pursuant
to article 13(l)(b) and 14(1)(a) (both involving monetary fines) if certain time limitations or information specifications are not met. Id. If the elimination of the "complete
information" requirement causes problems due to time restraints, the Commission can
reduce the time limitations after the proceedings begin. Id.
150. See Sherlinker, supra note 27, at 811 (stating that the slowness of the decision-making process in Brussels will make the twelve month period envisioned by the
Regulation appear optimistic).
151. Note, Sources and Developments, supra note 59, at 523.
152. See supra notes 120-32 (describing the issues associated with the division of
power problem as it relates to article 1(3) of the Proposal).
153. See TENTH REPORT, supra note 16, at point 20(iii) (stating that closer association of Member States in the Commission decision-making process regarding incompatibility remained an outstanding problem); Interview, supra note 79 (declaring the
incompatibility question to be a lingering concern blocking adoption of the Regulation);
Comment, EEC Antitrust: An Exercise in PriorRestraint, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
143, 171 (1975) (predicting as early as 1975 that the Regulation, as finally adopted,
would not leave decision-making solely in the hands of the Commission).
154. But see Reynolds, supra note 2, at 422 (noting that not all Council members
believe the Council ought to have final decision-making powers and citing Germany,
Denmark, and the Benelux countries as examples). These countries believe a "purely
consultative Committee with the final decision resting with the Commission" is entirely
proper. Id.
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and (8).155 To win the Council's approval, the Commission will need to

delegate a key decision-making role in merger control to the Council,
specifically a role in granting exemptions under article 1(3).
The Commission should grant the Council the power, under the Proposal, to submit policy standards that would outline the Community's
priorities under article 1(3).15"6 The Council, acting independently of
the Commission, would define the industrial, technological, regional,
and social areas in which it may grant special exemptions to firms planning to merge. 15 7 Once these policies are formulated, a separate office,
perhaps within Directorate B of DG IV, could take responsibility for
judging whether the firms' business falls within those specially exempted areas. Accordingly, one office would review the competitive effect of the merger and a separate Commission office would determine
the merger's exemption status. The European Court of Justice could
remain in a position to hear appeals."'
There are a number of reasons why the Council should possess the
sole authority to make article 1(3) exemption decisions. The Council
has valid legal reasons for having this power. The Treaty of Rome is
the legal foundation of the Common Market and every Commission
proposal must conform to its language and intent."" Since the Treaty
provisions defining the different roles of the Council and Commission
grant the Council general supervisory authority over the Commission,160 the Council may elect to retain its supervisory role in certain
situations. Indeed, regarding antitrust policy, article 87 specifically
gives the Council, and not the Commission, the direct responsibility for
adopting instruments to give effect to articles 85 and 86.1'1 The ration155. Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 19(7)-(8) (defining the role of the Advisory
Committee).
156. See EUROPE, No. 1946 (n.s.) 6-7 (Mar. 1976) (favoring the drafting of general article 1(3) exemption criteria). It is worth noting that this proposal has been
suggested before. See Weiler, Discussion Report, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL

209 (Hopt ed. 1982) [hereinafter Hopt] (suggesting that the Council define certain
"sectorial policies in relation to different markets and different industries which could
provide guidelines for decisions of competent Commission Authorities").
157. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 30 (specifying that the components of these
exemptions would answer Deleau's complaint that article 1(3) is very unclear).
158. Regulation 17, supra note 12, at art. 17. Currently under article 17 of Regulation 17, the Court hears appeals from Commission decisions. Id.
159. See supra note 54 (describing the requirement that institutional legislation be
based on provisions in the Treaty of Rome).
160. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 145 (defining the role of the Council); id. at 155 (stating that the Commission shall "exercise the powers conferredon it
by the Council for implementation of rules laid by the latter") (emphasis added). Only
through the Council's acts is a framework established through which the Commission
can implement Community policy. Id.
161. Id. at art. 87; see supra note 11 (providing text of article 87).
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ale for the hierarchical framework is that the social and human demands that the Council oversees should restrain the Commission's normally broad1 6 2 discretionary power as the administrator of the
Community's competition policy. 163
There are equally important policy reasons for adopting a decisionmaking scheme under article 1(3) that will allow the Council to make
exemption decisions. It is imperative that the Community use both a
subjective cost-benefit analysis and an objective analysis in determining
a merger's validity, because such business activity can have a significant effect on life outside the market sector. Because the Council is
legally and traditionally the policy-maker in non-market areas (determining social, political, and industrial issues facing the Community), it
is consistent that the Council have the capacity to prioritize public interest concerns with respect to mergers. This line of reasoning is the
premise supporting the German system of merger control. 84 Furthermore, this argument recently found strong support from scholars who
warn of the potential problems created when subjective and objective
evaluation are combined under one decision-making authority.',
The Commission's attempt to secure absolute discretion with respect
to granting exemptions is also inconsistent with current Community
practices. The use of block exemptions under article 85(3) of the
Treaty of Rome is an example of one such Community practice."1 6
During the 1960's many notification agreements seeking exemptions
162. See generally Regulation 17, supra note 12, preamble (providing the Commission with broad discretionary power regarding the implementation of its free market
ideals with respect to competition).
163. COMPARATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32, at 423.
164. Hopt, supra note 156, at 166. Under the German system, the Federal Cartel
Office evaluates competition and balances the pros and cons for competitive conditions.
Id. The Federal Minister of Economics, who is responsible for overseeing much of that
country's industrial policy, grants exemptions on the grounds of overriding economic
and public interest. Id.
165. THIRTY YEARS, supra note 2, at 349 (citing the importance of having all parties decide general non-economic policy regarding mergers at the Community level); A.
Jacquiem, Concentrationsand Mergers in the EEC, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL
165-66 (Hopt ed. 1982) (explaining the results when qualitative and quantitative
merger analysis are combined). Jacquiem believes that such a combined analysis would
result in: (1) the use of incompatible criteria; (2) the establishment of surreptitious
compromises; and, (3) the creation of value judgments better left to political powers.
Id. He maintains that the combination confuses objectives and tasks and further makes
it practically impossible to exercise control over adopted options). Id.
166. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 85(3) (permitting the Community,
in most cases, to adopt exemptions for certain classes of normally violative agreements
that somehow benefit the Community). Under the current procedure for granting block
exemptions the Council must first empower the Commission to adopt specific block
exemptions. The Council has the absolute authority to review which class of agreements the Commission may exempt. Id.
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were submitted to the Commission. In an effort to reduce the Commission's workload, the Council of Ministers authorized the Commission to
specify conditions under which it would grant exemptions to certain
types of agreements. The fact that such authorization is still required
before the Commission may establish block exemptions signifies the
Council's continued supervisory role in granting exceptions to Community law. It is necessary for the Council to retain a supervisory position
when evaluating concentrations in light of the Community's social and
regional policies, especially because of the power of concentrations,
more than restrictive agreements, to change permanently the structure
of an industry.
There is also an important political dilemma that is avoidable if the
Council is allotted this supervisory power. Where an exemption is given
at the Community level, Member States may lose the ability to prohibit concentrations at the national level. 167 While countries like
France, Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom believe that the Commission should consider national interests when granting an exemption,
others, notably Denmark and Germany, do not feel this is necessary.""'
From a strategic perspective, therefore, returning the entire policymaking responsibility to the Council will allow Member States to decide on which regional interests they want to consider.
The above arguments establish the rationale behind giving the Council, as opposed to the Commission, the power to draft policy outlines in
reference to article 1(3). In providing the Council with this one responsibility, the Commission will retain its power to confer decisions, and
still have ample discretion in making article 1(3) judgments. As long as
the Commission's decisions remain within the boundaries of the Council's exemption policy, the Commission will have the power to issue a
wide array of relief. Moreover, there is a checking mechanism built
into this exemption authorization procedure. The Council would have
to develop concrete guidelines to have any de facto decision-making
power. Given the diverse opinions among Council members, arriving at
a consensus is indeed a formidable task.""' The Commission would also
have considerable authority to make decisions under article 1(1) of the
167. See TEN-rH REPORT, supra note 16, at point 20 (discussing the "division of
responsibility" issue). In giving decision-making control to the independent Commission, Member States would lose their ability to object when an exemption harms their
sovereign interests. Id.
168. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 421 (providing the views of Denmark and Germany concerning the considerations of the Commission in granting exemptions).
169. COMMISSION OF COMMUNITY, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION
THE DRAFT TREATY: AN EVER CLOSER UNION 141-49 (1985).

PROCESS UNDER
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Proposal which is vague and manipulable."" 0 The Commission could
simply refuse to find a violation of competition in instances it considers
exemptible.17 ' Thus, although the Commission will abandon much of
its administrative authority on paper, as is legally and politically justified, it will retain most of its essential power in practice.
The most critical problems in the Regulation are found in the premerger notification procedure and the dual decision-making scheme associated with article 1(3). These problems continue to obstruct the approval process. In order to solve the remaining obstacles, suggestions,
like those set forth above, are necessary. Otherwise, the Commission
will be forced to continue to rely on archaic and ineffective laws dealing with merger activity.
B.

SUGGESTION

Two: THE SUPPLEMENTAL USE OF ARTICLE 85 TO
CONTROL MERGERS

Some speculate that the Commission will not relinquish further decision-making authority to the Council.172 If this speculation concerning
the Regulation is correct, the Commission should simply utilize article
85 as a supplement to article 86 in controlling mergers.
1. The Basis for the Commission's Reluctance to Use Article 85 to
Control Mergers
In 1966, the Commission decided against using article 85 17 to regulate mergers' 74 The Commission rendered its decision despite the conclusion by a working group designated to study the issue that the article could be applicable to mergers.17 5 There were several legal,
170. See DEBATES, supra note 60, at 28 (providing Hopper's belief that there is a
great potential for abuse given the article's ambiguity).
171. Id. at 38 (furnishing Hopper's added view that such ambiguity is necessary
for effective implementation of the article's two-prong, policy objective).
172. Interview, supra note 79.
173. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 85(1) (prohibiting all agreements
and concerted practices that "affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market").
174. See Concentration of Firms in the Common Market [1965-1969 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 9081 (January 21, 1966) [hereinafter 1966
Memorandum] (analyzing use and effect of articles 85 and 86). But see Adler &
Belman, Trends and Prospects in E.C. Antitrust Law, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 31, 38
(1973) [hereinafter Trends and Prospects] (suggesting that the legal arguments were
not decisive in the Commission's reasoning).
175. Markert, Antitrust Aspects of Mergers in the E.E.C., 5 Tax. INT'L L. FORUM
32, 46 (1969) [hereinafter Markert]. The Commission asked two groups of law professors to reach separately reasoned conclusions on whether articles 85 and 86 were appli-
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political, and practical reasons for the Commission's decision.
A fundamental legal and conceptual problem is in defining a merger
or consolidation as an agreement. The Commission expressed concern
whether a merger that results in a permanent structural change of two
undertakings could be classified as an agreement or concerted practice
within the meaning of article 85.17 More specifically, the Commission
believed that article 85 could not account for mergers that are involun1
tarily closed through stock purchases on the open market. 77
There were also political reasons why the Commission refused to use
article 85 to control mergers. 178 At the time of its decision, the Commission was very sensitive to the political sovereignty of individual
Member States.1 79 The Commission reasoned that if certain mergers
were legal under national laws and national authorities varied in the
priority they assigned to merger control, it would be illogical to apply
article 85 to these states uniformly.1 80 There has also been speculation
that the Commission's decision was dictated by a belief that European
industry was not sufficiently concentrated.1 81
Finally, the Commission highlighted several practical problems that
would arise in attempting to apply the article 85(3)12 exemption provision to mergers. The Commission doubted its ability to make the necessary evaluation under that provision.1 83 It felt unable to forecast the
effects of mergers as reliably as it could predict the effects of certain
cable to mergers. Id. The group studying article 85 decided 3 to 1 that the
should use it to combat mergers. Id.

Commission

176. 1966 Memorandum, supra note 174; see Cunningham, supra note 27, at 221
(noting the Commission's determination that article 85 was not appropriate to control
mergers because mergers involve changes in the enterprise ownership rather than enterprise anticompetitive behavior).
177.

Trends and Prospects, supra note 174, at 38.

178. See Note, Sources and Developments, supra note 59, at 508 (contending that
the Commission's decision was politically motivated); Coleman, European Economic
Community Antitrust Law: The Continental Can Decision-Forerunnerof a New European Anti-Merger Policy, 47 TUL. L. REV. 829, 857 (1973) (arguing that Continental
Can, which adopted almost completely the Commission's 1966 Decision, was decided
for purely political reasons).
179. See Trends and Prospects, supra note 174, at 37 (explaining that the Com-

mission had doubts about implementing its powers); Note, Sources and Development,
supra note 59, at 502 (noting that the goals of the Community are contradictory in
espousing long-range union but limiting short-range costs).
180. Markert, supra note 175, at 48.
181. THiRTY YEARs, supra note 2, at 348.
182. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, at art. 85(3) (stating that certain agreements or categories of agreements are acceptable if they contribute to improving aspects of commercial life within the Commission).
183. See H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcoNomnc Co ,tniumTY
3-202 (1982) [hereinafter H.

SMIT

& P. HERZoG] (enumerating the difficulties in

making an evaluation under article 85(3)).
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restrictive agreements.'" Moreover, since mergers resulted in a permanent structural change among the undertakings involved, the article
85(3) exemption, which is only allowed for a specified time period, 18
could not be extended to merging companies. 186 Finally, the Commission perceived a problem for firms in proving that the advantages under
article 85(3) could not be achieved through a vehicle less restrictive of
7
competition.18
2. Refuting the Basisfor the Commission's Reluctance to Use Article
85 to Control Mergers
The position that article 85 is inapplicable to mergers is completely
unfounded. Such use of article 85 is legally justified, and also practically and politically warranted by the current circumstances of European industry.
There are no legal or conceptual obstacles to adopting article 85 for
the purpose of controlling mergers. The language of article 85 states
that any "agreement between undertakings . . . which have as their

.. . effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition with
the common market

. .

. " will be prohibited. 88 While this language

presents no real problem when a merger is consolidated through an
agreement, it does pose a problem when a merger is concluded through
an open market share purchase.' 89 The European Court has interpreted
the term "agreement" within the context of article 85(1) so broadly
that the term's meaning is arguably extended to encompass the market
share merger transaction. 90 Moreover, the Commission may also be
moving closer to adopting a similarly broad interpretation of agreement.' 9 ' Even if the Commission refuses to apply article 85 to merger
184.

Id.

185.

See Regulation 17, supra note 12, at art. 8(l) (stating that an article 85(3)

exemption may only issue for a specified period).

186. See Cunningham, supra note 27, at 221 (declaring that the limited time period exemptions under article 85(3) and Regulation 17, article 8(1), are not adapted to

dealing with mergers).
187.
188.

Trends and Prospects, supra note 174, at 37.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 85(1).

189. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (indicating the Commission's substantial concern about defining open market share acquisitions as an agreement).
190. See H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 183, at 3-202 (arguing that the Court
implicitly recognized share purchase agreements on a stock exchange as an article
85(1) violation). They cite S.A. Brasserie De Hecht v. Wilkin, Case No. 23/67, 1967
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 407, 415, in which the Court held "in determining whether a
contract runs afoul of article 85(1), the existence of similar contracts may be taken

into consideration insofar as the totality of contracts of this nature is likely to restrain
the freedom of commerce." Id.
191. See infra note 202-06 and accompanying text (observing that a recent Coin-
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transactions, there simply is no valid reason for not applying the provision to mergers accomplished through an agreement. Article 85 covers
any significant restrictive effect on competition, whether directly
through a cartel agreement or indirectly through a merger.1 9 2 Under
the present system, undertakings could engage in otherwise restrictive
behavior, but avoid article 85 by disguising their arrangement in a
blanket merger.19 Finally, there is no reason to believe that the European Court of Justice would overrule a decision to apply article 85 to
mergers.

19

There is no political justification for not using article 85 in a merger
context. By its reluctance to impose Community's antitrust policies on
individual member states, the Commission ignores the entire premise of
Community law. Article 85 was not meant to be read as the acceptable
medium for antitrust laws of individual Member States, but was
drafted rather for the Community as a whole.1"" Today, reluctance to
mission decision to employ article 85 in a market share transaction giving rise to a
potential dominant position led to speculation that the Commission has become considerably more liberal in its deployment of the article).
192.

See A.

DERINGER,

THE COMPETITION LAW

OF

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 169

(1968) (stating "[i]f application of article 85(l) were based solely on an agreement
and not also on its content, the prohibition of 85(l) would apply to many agreements
including mergers. . . since mergers are frequently concluded through agreements and
such agreements can produce effects that result in a reduction of the number of competitors and hence reduce competition."); R. JOUET, MONOPOUZATION AND ABUSE OF
DOMINANT POSITION ix (1970) (Forward by J. Rahl) (arguing that the language of

article 85 obviously does not prevent the application of article 85 to mergers); A.
CAMPBELL, E.C. COMPETITION LAW: A PRAcrTIONER's TEXTBOOK 38 (1980) (noting
that the Commission's distinctions between cartels and mergers for purposes of applying article 85 have been seriously criticized).
193. See Mailanger, Mergers and Acquisitions in the Common Market: Problems
Under Corporation, Tax and Antitrust Law, I N.Y.U. J. IN"L L. & POL'Y 18, 35
(1968) (describing that in arguing for a rule-of-reason test, Prof. E. Steindorff notes
that both article 85 and 86 ought to be read together since "firms could resort to a
legal form of concentration to camouflage an arrangement solely to avoid violating article 85").
194. See Trends and Prospects, supra note 174, at 44 (speculating that although
the Court has never ruled on the applicability of article 85 to mergers, it might now
look on it favorably). The Court's implicit support for the applicability of article 85 to
concentrations is also found in the only direct decision on mergers. In ContinentalCan,
the Court insisted that, if necessary, both articles 85 and 86 be used together to achieve
the common objective under Article 3(f). Continental Can v. Commission, Case No. 6/
72, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. S. Rep. 215, 243, reprinted in [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) D 8171 (1973). Because mergers may at times distort
competition and hence violate an important Community goal, the Court's language
suggests that it was refusing to prohibit the possibility of using article 85 to control
mergers. See Cunningham, supra note 27, at 252 (stating that the Commission itself
relied on article 85(3) in its argument in Continental Can).
195. H. SMT & P. HERZOG, supra note 183, at 3-201.
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apply antitrust laws does not exist.19 The very fact that the Commission proposed the Merger Regulation indicates its willingness to assert
its power. The political motivation to encourage greater Community
1 97
concentration is also extinct.
The logistical difficulties in using article 85(3) to exempt certain
mergers are troublesome, but not insurmountable. The old concern that
the Commission is incapable of rendering an exemption decision obviously no longer holds since article 1(3) of the Proposal requires just
such an evaluation. 19 8 As for the difficulty in proving that article 85(3)
benefits could not be achieved through another arrangement less restrictive of competition, such an argument ignores the fact that concentrations may also improve certain non-economic conditions in the Community. 199 Imposing a time period and application renewal
requirements on merger agreements under Regulation 17, however,
presents a more difficult procedural problem. Nonetheless, nothing in
the language of this Regulation restricts the Commission from imposing conditions and obligations more attuned to a permanent
arrangement. 0
The Commission's initial reluctance to utilize article 85 as a means
to control concentration is plainly unfounded under today's circumstances. It is noteworthy that in 1966, the year the Commission elected
not to use article 85 to regulate mergers, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that the parallel provision to article 85, section one of the
Sherman Act, was applicable to mergers .2 0° Although publicly the
196. See Sherlinker, supra note 27, at 809 (arguing that in 1984 the Commission
was eager to capture more control).
197. See THIRTY YEARS, supra note 2, at 349 (stating that small and medium-sized
firms have returned to favor and that the subject of concentration has been critically
reappraised since the 1960's when the original article 85 application questions arose).
198. See Proposal, supra note 1, at art. 1(3) (providing an exemption for mergers
that attain certain Community priorities).
199. Trends and Prospects, supra note 174, at 38; H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra
note 183, at 3-202.
200. See Regulation 17, supra note 12, at art. 8. The relevant provision reads:
1. A decision in application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty shall be issued for a
specified period and conditions and obligations may attach thereto.
2. A decision may on application be renewed if the requirements of article 85(3)
of the Treaty continue to be satisfied.
3. The Commission may revoke or amend its decision or prohibit specified acts
by the parties .

.

. [when certain conditions arise].

Id.
201. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S.
665 (1964) (using section one of the Sherman Act to prohibit the merger of Kentucky's
first and fourth largest commercial banks); see also Markert, supra note 175, at 53
(criticizing the Commission for blatantly disregarding the United States proclivity to
apply section one of the Sherman Act to mergers).
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Commission continues to be adamant in its refusal to use article 85 in
merger cases, there is some evidence that it may be willing to abandon
this position. 202 In Philip Morris,0 3 the Commission made a significant
move towards applying article 85 to agreements involving stock acquisitions.2 The case involved Philip Morris' acquisition of control in a
holding company which, in turn, had a substantial minority shareholding in Rothmans International, a tobacco industry competitor of Philip
Morris. In attacking the acquisition, the Commission used both article
85 and 86. The significance of the decision is that the Commission
holds article 85 applicable to all cases concerned with share transactions. 0 5 In expanding the meaning of "agreement,"200 the Commission
moves one step closer to classifying a full shareholder acquisition (and
according to some definitions, a merger) as an article 85 violation.
Whether the Commission will take those final steps is of course another
crucial issue. Regardless, because the use of article 85 to regulate
mergers appears legally sound and practically applicable, a brief sketch
of its possible effects is in order.207
3. The Beneficial Effects of Using Article 85 to Help Regulate
Mergers
Using both article 85 and 86 to regulate mergers has many advantages. Although procedurally, such use lacks both the legal certainty of
numerical thresholds and the ability to control mergers a priori,it does
eliminate several of the substantive problems associated with employing
article 86 alone.
A serious problem with using article 86's language to control mergers is the requirement that one of the firms be in a dominant market
202. See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST COMPARATIVE GUIDE III 660 (1979) [hereinafter COMiPARATIVE GUIDE III]

(claiming that some Commission officials have indicated that under various circumstances, the Commission can apply article 85 to merger-type situations, e.g., certain
long-term joint ventures).
203. Philip Morris/Rothmans International, 28 O.J. EUR. CotM. (No. C 178) 3
(1984); FOURTEENTH REPORT, supra note 18, at point 98.
204. COMPARATIVE GUIDE III, supra note 202, at 660.
205. EUROPE, No. 3816 (n.s.) 15 (Mar. 1984) (available upon request at the information service in the European Community Delegation in Washington, D.C.).
206. See COMPARATIVE GUIDE III, supra note 202, at 660 (interpreting the decision as stating that where "a firm holding a minority shareholding in another firm
exercises sufficient influence on the latter firm's behavior in the market," it will constitute "an agreement to purchase the shares.")
207. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that Regulation 17 permits
the use of article 85 in conjunction with article 86). It is important to note this permissible combination when attempting to predict the effects of article 85 on mergers.
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position prior to the merger.2 08 Consequently, the Commission may not
take action against two large non-dominant undertakings whose merger
would result in the kind of concentrated market the Commission seeks
to avoid. 09 The language of article 85 could prevent such a legal dilemma since it allows the Commission to prohibit any agreement that
restricts, prevents or distorts competition. 10
The greater advantage article 85 provides is the ability for the Commission to utilize a bifurcated analysis.2 11 For the most part, article
85(1) and (3) parallel article 1(1) and (3) of the Merger Proposal. In
this context, the exemption clause under article 85(3) would afford the
Commission the flexibility to promote those types of anti-competitive
mergers it contends will prove beneficial to the Community.212 Merging
parties would likewise have greater opportunity to apply for exemptions. Although the procedure would remain limited to the Regulation
17 framework, undertakings could apply for either an individual exemption,213 or a block exemption. 14 In the end, as long as the Commission adopts a consistent policy toward granting certain merger exemptions, the beneficial effects of the bifurcated analysis of article 85(3)
will match article 1(3) of the Merger Proposal.
CONCLUSION
The current controversy concerning the effectiveness of the Commission's Merger Control Proposal symbolizes a deeper, more troublesome
political problem. On the one level, there are disputes over whether the
Proposal will serve its antitrust purposes. The advocates of the Proposal
argue that the criteria are sound and the procedure, while perhaps imperfect, is still effective. The opponents of the Proposal contend that
208.

See supra note 27 (discussing the absurdity of requiring one firm to be in a

dominant position prior to the merger).
209. Id.
210. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 85(1).
211. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose, procedure and benefits of the bifurcated analysis used in the Merger Proposal).

212. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (noting how under EC competition policy, the Commission often evaluates vertical and horizontal arrangements ac-

cording to factors not related to competition).
213.

See Regulation 17, supra note 12, at art. 4(1) (granting merging parties the

opportunity to seek an article 85(3) exemption on an individual basis).
214. See id. at art. 4(2) (detailing those categories of exemptions the Commission
will recognize per se). The Commission, however, must receive additional authorization
from the Council to grant block exemptions. See COMPARATIVE GUIDE, supra note 32,
at 498. But see H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 183, at 3-150-53 (arguing that

pursuant to article 9(l) of Regulation 17, the Commission has the sole power to grant
block exemptions to article 85(3)).

1987]

EC MERGER CONTROL

the criteria are inexcusably vague and the procedure renders useless
any helpful standards the Proposal creates.
On another level, there is the policy debate. This debate, as exemplified in the article 1(3) issue, centers on the pace at which Community
integration should occur. The states that endorse the Proposal are striving for a stronger, more unified Common Market whose authority regarding competition policy should reside almost exclusively within the
auspices of the Commission. Those states that criticize the Proposal
wish to maintain a greater level of sovereign independence. These latter
nations take issue with the fact that their own unique industrial structures prevent successful assimilation into a broader Community system
of antitrust.
Acknowledging this two-tier policy debate, this Comment presents
two suggestions. The first suggestion involves political compromise and
retracts some executive authority from the Commission. Even assuming
the suggested amendments would deprive the Commission of its ability
to administer competition policy freely, these concessions are completely justified. As long as the Community is composed of individual
national sovereignties, unanimity, in accordance with the procedures set
forth in the Treaty of Rome, is required for any decision pertaining to
the pace at which those nations will integrate. Consequently, where
compromise is mandated, as in the present situation, the Commission
must retreat to its traditional role, subordinate to the Council of Member States. This Comment, therefore, recommends that the Commission first attempt to modify the existing Proposal before undertaking
any action under article 85.
Nevertheless, this Comment also recognizes that economic conditions
may demand the circumvention of certain traditional methods of legislation. As merger activity within the Community becomes more unmanageable, and as global competition among multinationals becomes
increasingly fierce, there may come a time when the Commission is
forced to forego political compromise and adopt a short-term antitrust
strategy; a strategy that may include using article 85 to control mergers. Whether the present merger and takeover climate warrants such a
strategy is beyond the scope of this Comment. It appears, however, that
the Commission is prepared to avail itself of this second suggestion.
The recent Philip Morris decision, and recent remarks by Commission
officials 2 5 exemplify this changing attitude about article 85's potential.
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining that Commission officials are now more receptive to applying article 85 to mergers).
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With economic growth surging again in Europe 216 and the possible failure of reaching a political compromise on the Merger Proposal,2 17 the
expanded use of article 85 to regulate merger activity may be
inevitable.

216. See Kirkland, Growth Takes Hold in Europe, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1986, at 112
(noting increase in business investment and consumer spending in Europe generally and
in West Germany in particular).
217. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (speculating that the Commission
will refuse to surrender any more decision-making authority to the Council).

